Greg Detre
Monday, 05 June, 2000
Dr Tasioulas - Essay VI
It is a testament, either to the richness or the impenetrability, of Mill�s account of utilitarianism that his doctrine is still both supported and debated. Although utilitarianism provides a powerful and practicable standard of the �Good�, the length of Mill�s concluding chapter is evidence of the theory�s vulnerability to attack with regard to justice and the area of rights. Justice is one area where, like the swirling mists of a crystal orb, one can see what one looks for in Mill.
Rawls� brief analysis of utilitarian doctrines as an example of teleological theories penetrates to the quick of the problem of incorporating justice into a utilitarian framework. He follows Mill�s own path, and moves from the ends of the individual to the ends of the aggregate. At the lower level then, each man acts to achieve his greatest good and advance his rational ends as far as possible. Rawls takes this goal as being the maximisation of the satisfaction of rational desire, though he points out that utilitarianism can accommodate almost any prudential theory which directs itself towards the maximisation of any single quantity or identifiable set of qualities, such as pleasure.
In a quick paragraph, Mill glosses over the pivotal assumption that what is rational for one man then must be right for an association of men. This progression from the level of the individual to the level of society is where utilitarianism�s difficulties begin. Rawls seizes on this fallacy, describing it:
�Just as an individual balances present and future gains against
present and future losses, so a society may balance satisfactions and
dissatisfactions between different individuals�
Each man, in realising his own interests, is certainly free to balance his own losses against his own gains. But a society is a cluster rather than an aggregate of men � their disparate and partial desires do not integrate to form a principle of advancing the welfare of the group. The principle of choice for one man does not extend to a principle of choice for a group of men, since a group does not and cannot function as a unit, fulfilling desires within itself impartially as a single man does. This Fallacy of Composition runs:
"xRxx entails
"x"yRxy
where
Rxy = x seeks to advance y�s ends
Just because everyone seeks to advance their own ends does not entail everyone seeking to advance others� ends.
It seems that, with his propensity for pseudo-scientific justifications, Mill has in mind something rather like the hive: each individual bee is its own agent, seeking its own ends. But the emergent property of all the bees� collective actions is the benefiting of the hive. Perhaps, Mill thinks, with a bit of evolution through education, we too could learn to be as single-minded in our furtherment of the human hive, just as wasps die from their sting and men die for their country.
On a side note, this can perhaps be compared (at the cost of gross simplification) with the debate about European Monetary Union. A single country functions with only one currency and monetary policy, so a Liverpudlian shopkeeper can sell his wares in London without concerns of exchange rates. Similarly, an aggregate of countries sharing a currency and monetary policy could benefit from freer, wider markets and reduced costs and hassle of exchange across borders (amongst other things). However, like utilitarianism, this scheme fails to take into account the separateness of nations. Although the English are prepared to subsidise and support areas of relative poverty within their borders, it is partiality to their countrymen that engenders this, not impartiality to all men. This necessary partiality does not extend towards our fellow EU members, and human sympathy (however much wider and more sophisticated it may be than our animal forebears) is insufficient.
�
Although critically important, let us allow that this gap in the argument can be bridged, and consider the ramifications of impartiality for justice.
Mill starts with an admission of how potent our sense of justice is. But he does not believe that justice, or the lack of provision for its principles in a utilitarian framework, proves an insurmountable problem for utilitarianism.
If Mill is to succeed in his reconciliation of justice and utilitarianism, then he must cede objective justice to the overall principle of utility. For if he allows our commonly-held sense to stand of a genuine, separate justice that exists to dictate what is right, then his over-arching principle of utility founders.
In fact, justice is just another moral sentiment, rather like conscience perhaps. As such, it can (and hopefully will) be moulded and subsumed into a sentiment which equates justice and moral right with the utility being served. This hope for an overarching utilitarian moral sentiment is the answer Mill holds up to all objections of human partiality.
However, Mill is aware that in order to wholly rid us of the idea that there is an objective justice, he needs to explain why our sense of it is so strong. He turns to a naturalistic, or etymological, account of the origins of justice. He is intending to show how there can be a powerful, but contingent relationship between our sentiments of justice and utilitarian morality. Our sentiments of justice are but an elevated, animal desire to punish, deriving from a combination of: our natural impulse to protect ourselves for security; and the powerful feeling of sympathy which, in humans, has developed to embrace our entire race.
Justice then is the domain of morality which concerns perfect rights, those where there is some other assignable person who can claim a correlative right to an obligation. By contrast, imperfect obligations are those where there is no one who has a correlative right. For example, though I may feel an obligation to give to charity, there is no one assignable person who has a right to my charity. By examining our notion of justice, we can see that injustices concern perfect rights, always involving a wrong done and some assignable person who has been wronged. And in order to exact justice, there must be a belief that some particular individual has been harmed, and a desire to punish the person who caused that harm.
Mill thinks he has neatly defused the problem of justice as a separate framework conflicting with the principle of utility. He has explained where the strength of our indignation towards injustice stems from, and he has incorporated justice into a restricted domain of morality, that of perfect rights. Indeed, he is able to further delineate six inter-related spheres within this moral domain where we speak of justice:
1. legal rights (those that the society�s legal code recognises)
2. moral rights (like �natural law�, those that should be included as a legal right)
3. desert (getting what is deserved, good for good and evil for evil)
4. contracts (breaking faith or disappointing expectations voluntarily engendered)
5. impartiality (being influenced by irrelevant considerations, e.g. race or sex)
6. equality (the only relevant, impartial consideration in distribution is of need)
Aside from the aetiology that underpins it, Mill�s spheres of justice provide an impressively broad but neat categorisation of the realms of the just and unjust. The important point in his system is that our moral outrage to injustice is an animal, emotive and educatable response, rather than a response to a genuine principle in conflict with utilitarianism.
In order for him to incorporate justice seamlessly, Mill needs to show how all of this fits in with his previous secondary principles of customary morality. He does this by claiming that just people resent only harms �of the kind which society has a common interest with them in the repression of�. Thus, the sentiment of justice is aroused against those who disobey the rules of customary morality (grounded on the promotion of utility), which protect the rights of individuals.
The purpose of this discussion of justice in general is to see how distributive justice, in particular, fits in with utilitarianism. Rawls and Williams, with their talk of the �separateness of persons�, partiality and the personal point of view, would have us believe that utilitarianism tramples over the crucial, selfish individuality which characterises us, a species evolved to relish our position at the top of the food chain in a harsh, natural and predatory wilderness, rather than to discuss and implement systems of ethics.
In order to be firm and safe, utilitarianism could show that even without tying an account of justice to a naturalistic, pseudo-evolutionary explanation, our natural sentiments of justice are enough to ensure distributive justice. Certainly, we feel keenly the injustice of the partiality and inequality of distribution of the world�s wealth, food and comforts. But unfortunately, those of us enjoying these luxuries do not feel a correspondingly keen desire to redress the balance. This is why Mill is at such pains to say that our current moral sentiments are contingent. The breadth of moral sentiments felt by different people might or might not support an acquired sense of morality, but it does demonstrate that our moral plasticity fiercely resists being moulded into whatever our parents wish it to be. Perhaps though, in the future, we could educate in our children a strong utilitarian sentiment as Mill wishes.
But, does the utilitarian creed so overlook the issue, that even in its ideal state, we could not be guaranteed distributive justice? As every utilitarian thinker has stressed, utilitarianism is about maximising, not equalising, the distribution of utility. Does that mean to say that if the utility is maximised, even in an unjust world, that is the best we can and should aim for? This seems wrong, and indeed, Mill discounts the possibility of laudable injustice. The salvation to the utilitarian cause is the law of diminishing returns. This states, for example, that a rich man will derive less utility from a five pound note than will a beggar. The system is already weighted towards an egalitarian distribution. In the case of utilitarianism, the invisible hand is that of the moral agents keeping a close eye on the aggregate utility, rather than the forces of supply and demand in free market economics. But the principle is still analogous � because the marginal utility will always be higher for those with less than those with more, the right action will be correspondingly egalitarian and justly distributive. This is an attractive idea that is difficult to debunk. Indeed, it forms the basis of Mill�s proof for the sceptic, who seeks his own utility � in much the same way as Rawls� �original position� contractarian would desire a just system to lessen the risk of being treated unjustly, so a moral agent might desire utilitarianism because it offers the likelihood of a higher utility. In a sense though, marginal utility is the utilitarian�s asylum of ignorance � when pressed, they resort to the reply that utility will be maximised even in situations where it might seem not, because the incalculable marginal utility will ensure it.
Can we try anything else to bolster utilitarianism�s sense of distributive justice? Rawls considers what would happen if the distribution of goods was also counted as a good, perhaps a secondary principle. Since the problem of distribution is one of right, this might muddy the distinction between what is right and what is good. Pleasures would no longer be ranked purely by the criteria of classical utility � indeed, utility would be partly dependent on the distribution of utility, and so the same activity might be right or wrong depending on the state of the world. This brings up the issue of limited knowledge, as well as erroding the clean distinction of right and good, and the supremacy of utility that Mill is so keen to preserve. The difficulties of implementation may prove the harder objection to quell. Moreover, it brings us back to the debate about qualitative pleasures � not only would this further variable prove impossible to measure, but impossible to compare directly.
conclusion � how successful is mill?
although
he makes no specific allowances for distribution, he�s convincing
other
than the fact that it admits laudable injustice, and as williams
(immortally) says, it�s not about the answer it gives, but the way it looks
at the question
rawls
refuses to relegate justice in this way - it�s all about the primacy of
justice in your moral framework
Mill would like to explain self-sacrifice as evidence of the natural sympathy which he claims underlies our sense of justice. In contrast, Williams and Rawls both point to the partiality of humankind. If we look to science for arbitration, then we see that partiality lies at the core of our �selfish genes�, and though utilitarians might point to a hard-wired sense of altruism, it is an altruism in which we have vested interests.
Rawls might accept that we certainly can sympathise widely, even with starving children whose names we don�t even know, but we could easily account for this.
partiality
empathy
In the same way, Rawls would accept that we may make decisions that
in a sense then, one can argue that utilitarianism has one of the most�
flexible mechanisms for distribution
the �invisible hand� that doles out on the basis of marginal utility
certainly one that has stubbornly resisted the efforts of economists to exorcise in any form of centralised or � form
so moralists find it difficult to replace the principle of utility
not with another high-order principle of distribution
nor with �
depending on how hihg up in the moral hierarchy you place justice, you can see how important is the desire to punish, our animal aetiology and revenge
it�s all about the primacy of justice within the over-arching framework of morality
introduction - rawls
description of utilitarianism
lack of separateness of persons, fallacy of composition
the problem of
incorporating justice into the utilitarian framework
mill�s naturalistic explanation of the strength of our sentiment of justice
mill defining justice as merely a domain of morality
perfect/imperfect rights
6 spheres of justice
but what about distributive justice?
what would happen if mill did allow a principle of distribution?
rawls teleological theory: muddying the right/good distinction
hare � formal justice
marginal utility is the necessary and unassailable �invisible hand�
conclusion � how
successful is mill?
although he makes no specific allowances for distribution, he�s convincing
other than the fact that it admits laudable injustice, and as williams (immortally) says, it�s not about the answer it gives, but the way it looks at the question
rawls refuses to relegate justice in this way - it�s all about the primacy of justice in your moral framework
assumes homogeneity ???
Mill might like the example of a hive of bees, for so I think he rather thinks of humanity
each individual bee is its own agent, seeking its own ends
but the emergent property of their collective actions is to the benefit of the hive � indeed, wasps die for the hive with their single sting
with a bit of educated evolution, we too could learn to be as single-minded in our furtherment of the hive
lots of further examples spring to mind: football teams
contrast this with an engine
like a society of mechanical parts, the
the aim of the sparkplug is to ignite; the aim of the engine is to drive the wheels
1. why can�t there be a secondary principle of distribution?
utilitarianism = correct but sub to threshold requirement
need = primary criterion for distribution as a customary morality, but
only because it will tend to max util
depends on criterion of rights vs decision procedure
2. what�s the difference between rawls� point about �separateness of persons� and last week�s question of �point of view�
3. what difference does it make if the good is defined independently or distinctly from the right?
4. is this important/contentious?:
it does not matter how this sum of
satisfactions is distributed among individuals
(any more than it matters how one man distributes his satisfactions over time)��
5. are moral rights the same as natural law?
6. how does Mill account for justice within his utilitarian framework?
7. how can he be so sure that there will not be laudable injustice?
8. if justice is � something �which some individual person can claim from us as his moral right�, then how can the state prosecute?
9. does anything hinge in Mill�s aetiology/etymology of justice/morality/desire to punish etc.?
10. it would be ok for a rule-utilitarian to assert the primacy of justice
but the point is surely that Mill would accept laudable injustices in extreme cases where the utility would be served, even though it forms the �very groundwork of our existence�
11. why is it that justice seems inadequately accounted for in utilitarianism?
12. what is it about justice that makes it seem more of a first principle than simply a sentiment?
the sentiment that attaches to it
is so strong, and so defined in its domain, and so commonly-felt
and some of the 6 spheres don�t seem explicable in terms of a natural security impulse or sympathy (???)
13. is this argument against justice as an independent moral standard any different to that against utilitarianism?
ambiguity of the deliverances of our sense of justice
different individuals have varying views of what is just in particular areas
the same person can have conflicting principles of justice
14. doesn�t Mill�s argument about different people�s views on punishment show that there must be cases of laudable injustice?
all the different views on punishment etc.
based on �confessedly true� rules of justice
leads in nicely to Hare�s point about contingent level/rules in morality
15. so what is Mill�s conclusion about punishment, taxation etc.?
16. does that mean that GBH and the like, come under justice?
i.e. the bits that Griffin would exclude from his personhood test of liberty, which are included by the harm test, would come under justice?
17. what might the secondary principles be?
justice
honesty
loyalty
health
virtue
liberty?
18. justice vs integrity? what is justice
19. how can it account for retributive justice?
the victim�s desire for revenge and the usual explanations of deterrents create sufficient utility from punishing the criminal
20. is Mill confusing sympathy with empathy � supports a contractarian system of justice???
21. is justice like conscience?
22. is this week�s essay about the domain of justice?
Justice
Maintenance of legal, social, or moral
principles by the exercise of authority or power; assignment of deserved
reward or punishment; giving of due deserts.
The administration of law or of legal processes; judicial proceedings. Infliction of punishment on an offender, esp.
capital punishment; execution. lme�e17. The quality or fact of being just; (the
principle of) just dealing or conduct; integrity, impartiality, fairness 6 ��� Conformity (of an action or thing) to moral right or to reason, truth, or fact; = justness 2, 3. l16. 4 ��� t. o. echewa The elders..in spite of
their long-winded orations about justice were prone to deviousness and
chicanery. distributive justice. do justice to (a) give
(a person) his or her due, treat fairly by acknowledging the merits etc. of
(someone); (b) treat (a subject or thing) in a manner showing due
appreciation, deal with as is right or fitting; �(c) pledge with a drink. do
oneself justice perform something one has to do in a manner worthy of one�s
abilities. in justice to in fairness to. poetical justice, poetic justice the ideal
justice in distribution of rewards and punishments supposed to befit a poem
or other work of imagination; well- deserved unforeseen retribution or reward |
Retributive |
Distributive |
|
Characterized by or of the nature of
retribution, recompense, or punishment. |
Having
the property of distributing; characterized by dealing out in portions or by
spreading; spec. pertaining to or
designating a political system etc. under which property is owned by the
largest possible number of people distributive justice justice consisting in the distribution of something in shares proportionate to each recipient�s deserts; esp. justice concerned with the distribution of rights, duties, etc., among individuals and groups in society. |